Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism about Objects by Le Bihan, Baptiste
Why aGunkWorld is Compatible withNihilism
about Objects
Baptiste Le Bihan
Department of Philosophy, University of Rennes 1
Ted Sider argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the metaphysi-
cal possibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism is awed. I shall
describe one kind of nihilism able to answer this objection. I believe that most of
the things we usually encounter do not exist.at is, I take talk of macroscopic ob-
jects and macroscopic properties to refer to sets of fundamental properties, which
are invoked as a matter of linguistic convention. is view is a kind of nihilism: it
rules out the existence of objects; that is, from an ontological point of view, there
are no objects. But unlike the moderate nihilism of Mark Heller, Peter van Inwagen
and TrentonMerricks that claims that most objects do not exist, I endorse a radical
nihilism according to which there are no objects in the world, but only properties
instantiated in spacetime. As I will show, radical nihilism is perfectly compatible
with the metaphysical possibility of gunk. It is also compatible with the epistemic
possibility that we actually live in a gunk world.e objection raised by Ted Sider
only applies to moderate nihilism that admits some objects in its ontology.
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1. Between a Nihilist World and a GunkWorld
Ted Sider (1993) argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the
metaphysical possibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism
is awed.1 I believe him to be right. However, I want to develop a new kind
of nihilism in order to escape the argument. First, let me explain what gunk
is. An object is made of gunk if it is composed of spatially atomless stu: it
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1 Sider has changed his mind on this topic and now endorses nihilism. He oers a dierent
answer to the objection he raised in 1993, based on a particular metaphysics of modality:
modal deationism. An advantage of my own proposal is that it remains neutral with
respect to the metaphysics of modality. See his dra “Against Parthood” on his website.
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can be innitely divided into smaller and smaller spatial parts (or equiva-
lently, in a four-dimensional view, into spatio-temporal parts). So, an object
made of atomless gunk does not admit of simplemereological parts; for each
proper spatial part of the object, this very part has some smaller proper spa-
tial parts, and each of those parts has again some yet smaller parts. It was
rst discovered that atoms are not really atoms: they are composed of neu-
trons, protons and electrons.en we discovered that neutrons and protons
are composed of quarks. If we live in a gunk world, we will never nd out
some fundamental level of physical reality, and particles will innitely ad-
mit smaller and smaller particles as proper parts. Hence, a gunk world is a
world like ours, except that it is not composed of mereological simples, but
of gunk. For the sake of argument, I will follow Sider and conceive of a gunk
world as ruling out living entities; instead I will focus on inanimate entities
and thereby ensure that the very matter we are considering here remains
unconnected to the diculties of accounting for living things.
To be sure, in support of his argument Sider does not need to rely on the
fact thatwe actually live in a gunkworld. What he needs is just themetaphys-
ical possibility of a gunk world. But notice that it is because it seems possible
that our actual world is a gunk world that the metaphysical possibility of a
gunk world appears so convincing to Sider. While this argument was for-
mulated with van Inwagen’s quasi-nihilism in mind,2 I will reformulate it to
t nihilism.is move does not involve a major break. Sider himself writes
in a footnote (Sider 1993, 286): “My argument, if successful, refutes not only
[Quasi-nihilism], but also the view van Inwagen calls ‘Nihilism’, according
to which no composite objects exist”.
2. Sider’s Argument
e nihilist claim seems to highly contradict common sense. Aer all, who
would like to buy the thought that all objects of ordinary life are unreal? I
see the table right in front of me, and I have prima facie no reason to doubt
of its existence. To make the nihilist claim plausible, an error theory is re-
quired: an explanation of why I count those objects as being real although
they are not has to be provided.is explanatory work is to be done by the
paraphrase strategy. Sentences about ordinary objects are said to be false,
even though they seem to be true, because there are complicated truths cor-
responding to those falsehoods. As Sider writes:
What are the complicated truths that we do not bother to assert, ut-
tering instead falsehoods like “there are some tables”? Complicated
2 According to quasi-nihilism, composition sometimes occurs under special conditions. For
instance, for van Inwagen it merely occurs when there is an activity of life.
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assertions about the smallest parts of the “tables”. Rather than claim
that there are many fundamental particles here in my “room” next to
my “chair”, which particles behave so as to prevent my “computer”,
“keys”, and “briefcase” from falling to the “oor”, instead I say simply
“ere’s a table in my room”. (Sider 1993, 286)
e paraphrase strategy is attractive because it is a lot simpler to act as if
the alleged objects were real. It makes sense to think that we need shortcuts
to refer to complicated arrangements of particles. In other words, a nihilist
defends that only paraphrase assertions are true, when ordinary assertions
are false (like ‘there is a table in my room’). is is because ordinary asser-
tions are the conjunction of two components, one that is literally true (what
is conveyed by the paraphrase assertion), and something more that is not.
is supplementary implicit assertion is an existential one.e ordinary as-
sertion conveys the idea that there is not only the arrangement of the parts,
but also a whole that literally exists, the table in our example. In daily life, it
does notmatter if the existential component is true: indeed, it does notmake
any concrete dierence with respect to our actions and practical beliefs. To
sum up, an existential sentence about an ordinary object is false because it is
composed of a true component, the paraphrase description, and a false one,
the genuinely existential component. According to the nihilist, absolutely
all sentences about ordinary objects are false in this way.
What is important is that the nihilist needs the paraphrase strategy. More
exactly, she needs an error theory and the paraphrase strategy is the only nat-
ural candidate to do such a work.is is what Sider advocates in his paper:
the nihilist needs the paraphrase strategy, but she cannot buy it. Indeed,
the aim of Sider’s argument is to show that “there are (or rather, might have
been) situations in which ‘objects’ like tables and chairs are not composed of
fundamental particles”. If this is true, then the nihilist loses her way to ex-
plain the alleged contradiction with common sense, she cannot provide an
error theory of why we constantly (and falsely) believe that we are referring
to objects:
So, van Inwagen can respond to the criticism that his view contradicts
common sense. [But] van Inwagen’s procedure for soening the harsh
dictates of [Quasi-nihilism] will not always work, for there are (or
rather, might have been) situations in which “objects” like tables and
chairs are not composed of fundamental particles. (Sider 1993, 286)
Now that we have seen why the nihilist cares so much about the para-
phrase strategy, it remains to be understood what is problematic about this
strategy. Here is one way to put Sider’s argument:
(1) Necessarily, there are no composite objects (nihilist hypothesis).
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(2) Necessarily, “composite objects” are arrangements of mereological
simples (paraphrase hypothesis).
(3) Gunk worlds are metaphysically possible (gunk hypothesis).
(4) In gunk worlds, “composite objects” are not arrangements of mere-
ological simples (per the denition of a gunk world).
(5) In gunk worlds “composite objects” both are and are not arrange-
ments of mereological simples (2 & 4).
So from the three hypotheses follows a manifest contradiction, (5).e
nihilist has a general way of explaining our ordinary talk about ordinary
objects that accounts for our intuition that there are objects. But this expla-
nation is not available in a gunkworld: there are no particles in such a world,
and the paraphrase strategy cannot be used in order to explain our intuition
that there are objects. Indeed, if we believe that there are tables, it is because
there are particles arranged tablewise. But in a gunk world we would have
the same intuition that there are objects, and the paraphrase strategy would
not work.
First, (1) and (2) might seem to be dubious. Why would we need this
operator of necessity? Why could we not stick to an actualist version of (1)
and (2): ‘In the actual world, there are no composite objects’ and ‘In the
actual world, ‘Composite objects’ are arrangements of elementary objects’?
is strategy, Williams (2006, 493) names it the contingency defense: “[it]
maintains that nihilism is true of the actual world; but that at other worlds,
composition occurs”. But Williams proposed strong arguments against the
view that mereological nihilismmight be contingently true. I do not want to
deal with these contingentist considerations here. What I will do, however,
is show that it is possible to propose an account of the compatibility between
nihilism and the possibility of gunk that remains neutral on themodal status
of metaphysical claims.3
It is important to see that (2) rests on the assumption of mereological
atomism, the idea that a paraphrase strategy requires an atomist ontology.
But should it not be possible to provide a paraphrase that is not committed to
mereological atomism, but a gunky ontology instead?4 It seems to be an easy
way out. And it is. A “table” could be said to be unreal, the tag ‘table’ referring
to a part of gunky stu that is tablewise. As Sider (1993, 286) explains:
3 For a defense of contingentism in metaphysics, see (Rosen 2006) and (Miller 2009, 2010,
2012). I nd the contingentist claim very strong because it generates epistemological wor-
ries: either metaphysical claims are to be known a posteriori because they are contingent,
or they are contingent and a priori. In both cases, an epistemological account is required.
4 I thank an anonymous referee for having raised this interesting question.
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Surely there is a gunk world in which some gunk is shaped into a gi-
ant sphere, and another where some gunk has the shape of a cube.
Surely, there are gunk worlds that most of us would describe as con-
taining objects much like objects from our world: tables and chairs,
mountains and molehills, etc.
is strategy seems to work. However, the diculty will re-appear in
just the same way. Either the gunk ontology is necessarily true, or it merely
holds contingently in the actual world. Let us have a look at the two cases.
If the world is necessarily gunky, then we have to substitute (2) with (2’):
(2’) Necessarily, “composite objects” are arrangements of gunky stu
(paraphrase hypothesis).
If the gunk ontology is necessarily true, then we have to rule out the
metaphysical possibility of an atomistic world. In the sameway that we want
to ground themetaphysical possibility of gunkworlds, themetaphysical pos-
sibility of atomistic worlds should not be denied. Hence, it is not an option
to replace (2) with (2’).
On the other hand, if a gunk ontology holds in a contingent way in the
actual world, we would have to drop (2) in favor of (2”):
(2”) In the actual world, “composite objects” are arrangements of gunky
stu (paraphrase hypothesis).
en we need to endorse once again the contingentist claim that some
metaphysical claims are contingently true.
What about (3), the claim that gunk worlds are metaphysically possible?
Could we not just accept that this alleged possibility is illusory? According
to Sider (1993, 288) this is strongly problematic:
is is what I nd implausible. [. . . ] I nd the possibility of gunk so
compelling that I am willing to reject any theory that rules it out.
Indeed, the possibility of gunk should be taken seriously before we even
think of rejecting it as being illusory. I think that a lot of philosophers would
be glad to accept this possibility based on our intuitions: then, another way
to block Sider’s argument would be more than welcome. We denitely have
to try to account for this intuition. Still, Williams (2006) endorses this view
that he calls the impossibility defense: gunk worlds are not possible. Accord-
ing to him, Sider is not only expressing a personal intuition, but he is also
using a kind of conceivability argument: gunk worlds are conceivable, then
gunk worlds are possible. But once again, a nihilist solution that deals with
a genuine gunk possibility seems to be in a better dialectical situation than
one that has to reject it as being merely illusory.
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For now, we have seen two ways of challenging Sider’s argument. First,
contingentism about nihilism could be endorsed by rejecting (1) and (2).
Secondly, the metaphysical possibility of gunk worlds could be taken to be
merely illusory by rejecting (3). Both of these solutions have their own ad-
vantages and costs. I would like to propose a third solution that I take to be
original. More of that, I takemy solution to be interesting with respect to the
two rst ones because it remains neutral on the modal matters, by showing
that a very same world can be both nihilist and gunky in a robust sense.
To do that I challenge (4). I advocate that the denition of a gunk world
does not rule out the presence of mereological simples in this world. More
precisely, I deny the identication ofmereological simples to elementary ob-
jects. I will show that gunk worlds can be conceived of as not lackingmereo-
logical simples. Roughly, mymove will involve the claim that properties can
play the role of mereological simples in a gunk world instead of elementary
objects. en, the kind of nihilism that denes objects in terms of conven-
tions linking properties (instead of particles) is compatible with both a gunk
ontology and an atomistic one.
3. Toward a New Radical Nihilism
A certain kind of nihilism provides resources for dealing with Sider’s objec-
tion. According to this view, what exists is only spacetime and properties di-
rectly instantiated at spacetime points. Such a position is distinct, but close
to some ideas of Schaer (2009) and Heller (2008). To be sure, Jonathan
Schaer is not a nihilist. He believes that objects are real and identies them
to regions of spacetime:
[G]iven that spacetime is one sort of substance, should material ob-
jects be regarded as a second distinct sort of substance? [. . . ] No, says
the monistic substantivalist. Spacetime is substance enough.ere is
no need for the dualism of the contained and the contained (or for
fundamental containment relations). When God makes the world,
she need only create spacetime. en she can pin the fundamental
properties directly to spacetime. (Schaer 2009, 133)
Substantivalism states that spacetime is a substance, in accordance with
the Aristotelian criterion of fundamentality: it is a substance whose exis-
tence does not depend on the existence of something else. Schaer defends
such a view and states that the world does not need to be created with more
ingredients than spacetime and properties to be the very world we are liv-
ing in. In this, he endorses monistic substantivalism: there is no need for a
further class of substances.
But Schaer is not a nihilist about material objects. Indeed, he endorses
what he calls the identity view. According to this view, material objects are
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identical to spacetime regions. He conceives of spacetime regions as pin-
cushions for properties. Schaer claims that, because properties can be con-
strued as being instantiated by spatiotemporal regions, spatiotemporal re-
gions are to be identied with objects.
But he (Schaer 2009, 133) goes on to say:
But the monist needs not hold the identity view. She might hold the
eliminative view, which denies the existence of material objects alto-
gether.
He takes the eliminative view of monistic substantivalism, the view that
there are no material objects, to be inferior to the identity view of monistic
substantivalism. I believe him to be wrong, but here is not the place to argue
so. What is of interest for my current purpose is that the eliminative view of
monistic substantivalism opens up new possibilities to be a nihilist. If classi-
cal nihilism takes mereological simples to be particles, the eliminative view
of monistic substantivalism oers new candidates for mereological simples:
natural properties.
Mark Heller endorses a dierent view but also endorses the idea of a
world constituted of properties located within spacetime:
I proposed that a complete description of the universe can be given by
describing the locations at which the fundamental properties are in-
stantiated. What I need to emphasize here is the proposed complete-
ness of this minimal description.e universe, as things actually are,
can be completely described without mentioning, for instance, don-
keys. I leave out nothing by not mentioning donkeys. is sounds
more daring than it is. I do not deny that there are donkeys. e
English sentence “there are donkeys” is true.is is compatible with
my claim that theminimal description is complete, because “there are
donkeys” is part of a higher level description of those same facts that
can be described more minimally. [. . . ] Whenever the fundamental
properties are distributed thus-and-so, the region in which they are
distributed can be described as containing a donkey. Of course, de-
scribing the region in donkey-terms is less specic than describing it
in more fundamental terms. ere are ever so many ways the prop-
erties could be distributed that wouldmake a donkey-description ap-
propriate. (Heller 2008, 88)
It might seem odd to characterise Heller as being a nihilist; he is not
denying that there are donkeys, or more generally, ordinary objects. Still,
according to Heller, objects are real but are not mind-independent. is
is the Conventionaleory of Objects. So, strictly speaking, Heller is not
a nihilist about ordinary objects: he assumes the existence of objects. But
these alleged objects are overdetermined descriptions of properties located
within spacetime. He writes:
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e Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship
between more and less fundamental ontologies. [. . . ] e less fun-
damental objects are merely conventional.is conventionalism has
consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is moti-
vated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that
the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any
reason to reject coincidence. (Heller 2008, 83)
Heller writes that “less fundamental objects are merely conventional”.
ere is then an ambiguity. What is the fundamental ontology: an ontology
of physical objects, or an ontology of properties located within spacetime?
I am not sure of Heller’s exact position. However, I believe he is inclined
towardmonistic substantivalism here, the idea that, fundamentally, all there
is are properties located within spacetime.
To sum up, Schaer and Heller take primary ingredients of the world to
be properties located within spacetime (the question of the precise nature of
spacetime is not relevant here). Fundamentally, the view is that there are not
any kinds of objects, or particles. Schaer cashes objects out by the identity
view, whereas Heller obtains them with his conventional theory of lesser
fundamental ontologies. I will not discuss the advantages and drawbacks of
these views here. But themoral to be drawn from Schaer andHeller is that,
what exists primarily, might be properties located within spacetime. And
it is an easy move to be a nihilist with this kind of fundamental ontology:
it only requires dropping the identity view (in the case of Schaer) or the
conventional theory of objects (in the case of Heller) to be a nihilist.
Monistic substantivalism takes spacetime as primitive; the spacetime
network is a substance (or many substances, if substances are to be iden-
tied with spatiotemporal regions, but this is another story). In rejecting
(4), the claim that a gunk world lacks mereological simples and cannot be
inhabited by “composite objects”, I want to emphasize that natural properties
are mereological simples or, at least, that some spare properties are mereo-
logical simples. A gunk world is inhabited by properties in the same way,
such that, for example squareness can be instantiated in dierent places. In
the same way a spare property, such as the property of generating an electro-
magnetic eld, inhabits a mereological atomistic world, it does so in a gunk
world.erefore, if I am right that the concept of mereological simples can
fall under two distinct categories, the category of objects and the category
of properties, we have opened up space for conceiving of a gunk world as
both containing one kind of mereological simples (properties) and lacking
another kind of mereological simples (elementary particles).
Let’s take an example, the cup of tea in front ofme. For the sake of clarity,
let’s beginwith the assumption of an atomisticworld.e cuphas properties,
such as color, fragility or shape: it’s brown, fragile and has a particular shape.
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Arguably, these properties are macroscopic ones. Usually, we conceive of
parts of objects as having properties too, groundingmacroscopic properties.
A particular molecular structure of the cupmakes it fragile for instance.e
naive account of object is that it is composed of elementary particles having
properties. And importantly, of fundamental particles having fundamental
properties. e cup is then a composite object having composite properties
(it’s brown and fragile), and it is composed of fundamental objects (particles)
having fundamental properties (for instance, gravitational and electromag-
netic elds).
Now, if we live in a gunkworld, this cup is innitely divisible into smaller
and smaller spatial parts, and there are no particles doing the job of being the
elementary fabric of the cup. It means we have to drop the category of fun-
damental objects, that is, particles. In this case, the cup is not composed of
fundamental objects, because the category of fundamental objects is empty.
Still, rejecting fundamental objects is prima facie neutral about the possible
existence of fundamental properties. If there would be such fundamental
properties, it seems we would have here genuine candidates for being mere-
ological simples, entities that need to be carefully examined.
But it could be asked whether a gunk world inhabited of fundamental
properties is even coherent. Should a gunk world not be conceived of as
globally lackingmereological simples, including properties?e gunkworld
hypothesis describes a world innitely divisible into smaller and smaller
parts, and says nothing about properties. So if the world is not composed of
objects but of properties, it might be the case that properties are innitely
divisible into smaller and smaller properties. However, this kind of gunk
view would be highly problematic. Indeed, how could we conceive of prop-
erties as being innitely divisible into ever smaller parts? In order to get a
grip on this problem, we need to introduce a distinction between logical and
extensive mereology.
Following L. A. Paul (2002), we can distinguish between extensional and
logical parts of an object: a chair, for instance, is extensively composed of
smaller spatial parts and is logically composed of properties, such as, being
red, having a curved armrest, having a at seat, or having a location. One
could ask if this logical mereology is genuinely a kind of mereology. Indeed,
this approach is at odds with classical mereology. Here it could be useful to
have a look at what Kit Fine writes on the subject:
Now, on the face of it, there would appear to be a wide variety of ba-
sic ways in which one object can be a part of another. e letter “n”
would appear to be a part of the expression “no”, for example, and
a particular pint of milk part of a particular quart; and if these two
relations of part are not themselves basic (perhaps through being re-
stricted to expressions or quantities), there would appear to be basic
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relations of part that hold between “n” and “no” or the pint and the
quart. It is also plausible that the way in which “n” is a part of “no” is
dierent from the way in which the pint is a part of the quart. For if
the two ways were the same, then how could it be that two pints were
only capable of composing a single quart, while the two letters “n” and
“o” were capable of composing two expressions, “no” and “on”. (Fine
2010, 562)
is is not the place to discuss how many kinds of mereology there are.
But I shall emphasize that it is prima facie attractive to endorse Fine’s view of
a plurality of kinds of mereological relations.en, L.A Paul’s logical mere-
ology could be acknowledged as a particular species of mereology, and the
classical approach might turn out to be too restrictive. What I want to do
now is to examine if this logical approach can help us in one way or another
to get a grip on the idea that properties could be composed of parts.
Importantly, objects and properties are fundamentally dierent vis-à-vis
mereology. Objects are involved both in extensional mereology and logical
mereology. By contrast, properties are legitimate candidates for mereology
only in the case of logical mereology. at is, an object can be analyzed
as being composed of smaller spatial parts (extensional mereology), but it
can also be analyzed as being composed of ontological ingredients, such as,
properties, relations, substrata, bundling relations, or whatever you take to
be included in the fundamental ontology of the world (logical mereology).
By contrast, a property cannot be extensionally composed of smaller parts.5
e concept of property is not a geometrical concept and, thus, is not
linked to considerations about extension. Only logical mereology could be
used for characterizing properties, such that a property could be composed
of simpler constituents. For instance, if you take spare properties to be dis-
positional properties, a spare property is composed of an actuality (the prop-
erty strictly speaking), a potential or actual manifestation, and a relation be-
tween the property and the manifestation. Note that I am not accepting this
description to be true, but only wish to provide an example of what a logical
mereology applied to properties would look like.
A gunk world is a world lacking mereological simples in the sense of ex-
tensional simples. But it remains neutral on the existence of mereological
simples in the sense of logical simples. e point of the concept of gunk is
that matter, whatever it might be, is innitely divisible into smaller parts,
5 L. A Paul (2002, 579) writes “e microparticles might not have proper spatial parts, but
they may still be composed of ‘smaller’ qualitative parts such as having mass and having
charge”. I think that the concept of smallness or generally size should be abandoned in
the case of logical mereology.e concept of “being smaller” is linked to space and exten-
sion and should not be used for describing logical mereology. Reserving it for extensional
mereology could help avoid confusion.
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where ‘smaller’ acts as an extensional concept. However, one might want
to advance a novel gunk hypothesis, where, the world would be likewise
gunk, yet not in the extensive, but only in the logical sense. A proponent
of “logical gunk worlds” would maintain that the world is not ontologically
grounded, since no fundamental entities exist.6 Instead, there would be an
innitely ne-grained analysis as for every constituent of the world. For in-
stance, properties could be composed of potentialities composed of X com-
posed of YZ, and so on. Even though I do not have a knockdown argument
against this view, the concept of worlds of logical gunk is not helpful with
the very problem I am addressing here. It would imply that any hope of ad-
vancing a fundamental ontology of the world would evaporate. It is indeed
incompatible with the realistic idea of a world with a fundamental ontolog-
ical structure that has to be discovered. If it is a philosophical hypothesis
of any interest, it is certainly not what is questioned here. A logical gunk
world would be incompatible with nihilism, because it would be impossi-
ble to provide a paraphrase for such a possible world: there would simply
be no fundamental entities that could be described by way of constructing a
paraphrase.
at is not to say that a new argument against nihilism could not be
based on the metaphysical possibility of logical gunk. But it would be a new
argument, very dierent from the one based on the metaphysical possibility
of extensional gunk that I am dealing with in this paper. Still, the metaphys-
ical possibility of a logical gunk world is far less tempting than the meta-
physical possibility of an extensional gunk world. I believe this view to be
bad for two reasons. First, it is not even clear whether talking about ever
more fundamental constituents of a property or a relation is at all coherent.
Secondly, this kind of logical gunk view generates an innity of ontological
primitives. For any ontological category of entity, there would be further
categories it is composed of in turn. It involves surrendering the principle of
ontological parsimony in the worst possible way: we would end up with an
innity of kinds of entities. A choice has to be made between a logical gunk
hypothesis and a fundamental ontology. Nihilists clearly side with the idea
of a fundamental ontology. Aer all, this is precisely because they believe in
6 Monism about fundamentality is what Karen Bennett (2011, 2) calls atlandism. According
to this view, there is only one “level” of reality: for any hypothetical entity x, either x does
not exist or x is fundamental. On the other hand, a lot of philosophers are pluralists and
think there are dierent ontological levels of reality, with some being more fundamental
than others. A pluralist can defend both that there is a nite number of levels, or that there
is an innite number of levels. In the rst case, she endorses the classical view according
to which there is a fundamental ontological level; in the second case, she endorses the
logical gunk view, according to which there is no fundamental level, but ever innitely
more fundamental levels.
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the existence of fundamental ontological things in the world that they do not
believe in macroscopic objects. In a nutshell, a logical gunk world rests on
ontological priority of the macroscopic world over the constitutive one: the
alleged whole is primary with respect to its alleged fundamental parts (in-
deed, the fundamental parts are not real). On the contrary, a nihilist world
rests on the idea that what is real is what there is at the fundamental level: the
alleged parts are more important than the alleged whole (indeed, the whole
is not real).
I will now tackle the claim that the metaphysical possibility of classi-
cal gunk (extensional gunk) is incompatible with the paraphrase strategy.
e problem is that Sider was only thinking about the kind of moderate ni-
hilists who endorse the existence of some fundamental objects (particles).
But there is another class of nihilists who endorse the claim that there are
no objects in the world, and properties are all there is. Both radical nihilists
and moderate nihilists endorse mereological nihilism according to which
composition of ordinary objects never occurs. Where they part company is
when it comes to the question of what ontological ingredients there are in
the world. For moderate nihilists, these are particles (or particles plus spare
properties), that is, objects. For radical nihilists, these are only properties.
Evidently, radical nihilism relies on a robust ontology of properties.
Properties are directly instantiated in spacetime, andwhat we call objects are
just conventions corresponding to sets of properties located in some space-
time regions. To achieve this goal it is enough to show that a world that is
both gunky and Eliminativist Supersubstantivalist (ES henceforth) is meta-
physically possible. Indeed, if the paraphrase strategy is reliable both in an
atomistic and a gunk world, and can account for our intuition that there are
objects, then the account of ordinary objects remains neutral with respect to
the presence or lack of mereological simples, understood as particles. Recall
that it was precisely Sider’s strategy to show that van Inwagen’s paraphrases
were not able to do the job in a gunk world. It follows that we have to show
that in a gunk world a paraphrase strategy in terms of properties is more
ecient than a paraphrase strategy in term of particles.
We are concerned with an extensive gunk world, where there are no ex-
tensivemereological simple objects: each object admits of ever smaller parts.
Yet, arguably, a gunk world is not a logical gunk world, because it permits
a primitive ontology, for instance, of objects and properties. An extensive
gunk world is compatible with an ES world. But it might be asked how a
world without objects could be gunky, if gunk theory is a theory about parts
of objects. Nevertheless, there is a natural reply. In an ES world, a gunk view
is now not a theory about parthood pertaining to objects and their parts,
but a theory about parthood obtaining between spacetime regions and their
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parts. It is still a theory about objects, in the sense that it is a theory about
the region of spacetime we dub objects. Under an ES assumption, a cup is
not an object, because there are no objects at all in the world (neither sim-
ple nor composite), and the alleged cup is a particular region of spacetime.
e gunk view therefore shis from an ontology of objects to an ontology of
spacetime.
4. Conclusion
Our discussion has shown that a radical nihilist is perfectly able to account
for the metaphysical possibility of a gunk world. Paraphrases target sets of
properties instantiated in the pattern of spacetime. Radical nihilism, as we
have interpreted it, is even compatible with the possibility that we may ac-
tually be living in a gunk world. Sider’s argument is only threatening the
classical kind of nihilism, according to which some objects (the particles)
exist and play the role of grounding entities in paraphrases. By compari-
son, radical nihilism provides the resources for dealing with the metaphysi-
cal possibility of gunk and the epistemic possibility that we actually live in a
gunk world. Not surprisingly, I suggest, therefore, the following thesis about
the actual world: tables and chairs do not exist aer all.
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